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Attorney Liability Under the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
BY CHAD M. KNIGHT*
JNTRODUCION
n 1977, Congress enacted the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
("FDCPA" or the "Act")' to protect consumers against debt
collection abuses.2 The FDCPA serves to prohibit abusive or harassing
communications by debt collectors to debtors.3 Originally, attorneys were
excluded from the Act's coverage.' However, in 1986, the FDCPA was
amended, and the exclusion for attorneys was removed.5
After this exclusion was removed, the state courts and lower federal
courts were divided on whether and under what circumstances the
FDCPA should apply to attorneys.6 The Sixth Circuit, in Green v.
Hocking,7 held that attorneys who collected consumer debts exclusively
* J.D. expected 1997, University of Kentucky College of Law; B.B.A.
1994, Mississippi State University.
'Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874
(1977), amended by Pub. L. No. 99-361, 100 Stat. 768 (1986) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692o (1994)).
2 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (1994).
aId. § 1692c(a).
4 Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-109, § 803(6)(F), 91
Stat. 874, 875 (1977), amended by Pub. L. No. 99-361, 100 Stat. 768 (1986).
' Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub.'L. No. 99-361, 100 Stat. 768
(1986) (amending Pub. L. No. 95-109, § 803(6)(F)).
6 Compare Green v. Hocking, 9 F.3d 18, 22 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that
an attorney engaged exclusively in the practice of law was not covered under the
FDCPA) with Scott v. Jones, 964 F.2d 314, 317 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that the
mere fact that attorney performed exclusively legal tasks did not preclude him
from being considered a "debt collector") and Zartman v. Shapiro & Meinhold,
811 P.2d 409 (Colo. App. 1990) (holding that "debt collectors" under FDCPA
included attorneys whose practices were limited to purely legal matters), affd,
823 P.2d 120, 125 (Colo. 1992).
7 Green v. Hocking, 9 F.3d 18 (6th Cir. 1993).
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through litigation were excluded from the FDCPA's coverage.' Then, in
April of 1995, the United States Supreme Court, in Heintz v. Jenkins,9
ruled that attorneys who regularly collect consumer debts fall within the
scope of the FDCPA, regardless of whether they collect debts through
litigation or through traditional debt collection methods, such as telephone
calls to debtors, collection letters, and repossessions."l
The 1986 amendments, and later the decision in Heintz, served as a
response to the most widespread criticism of the FDCPA since its
enactment in 1977: the exclusion from liability of attorneys engaged in
debt collection." In 1985, attorneys accounted for a greater proportion
of the debt collection industry than did collection agencies.' Prior to the
1986 amendments, however, an attorney was essentially permitted to act
as a traditional collection agency, yet avoid regulation under the FDCPA
solely because of his professional status.
Part I of this Note provides an overview of the provisions of the
FDCPA that are of particular importance to attorneys.' 3 Part II
analyzes the Supreme Court's decision in Heintz v. Jenkins.4 Part I
addresses the impact that Heintz will have on the way attorneys practice
debt collection law.'5 Finally, this Note concludes that all attorneys
engaged in debt collection, even on a limited basis, should obtain a
working knowledge of the provisions of the FDCPA to ensure compli-
ance.
16
I. THE PROVISIONS OF THE FDCPA
The FDCPA contains numerous technical provisions that an attorney
should carefully review before engaging in consumer debt collection. The
following provides an overview of some of the major requirements and
prohibitions contained in the Act.
8 See id. at 22.
9 Heintz v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 1489 (1995).
10 See id. at 1492.
" See H.R. REP. No. 99-405, at 2 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1752.
12 In 1985, 5000 attorneys were engaged in the debt collection industry as
opposed to 4500 traditional debt collection agencies. See id. at 2.
13 See infra notes 17-91 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 92-134 and accompanying text.
i" See infra notes 135-46 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
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A. Definition of a "Debt Collector"
An understanding of the terms "debt"' 7 and "debt collector"' 8 as
defined in the FDCPA is vital to an understanding of the application of
the Act. The scope of the Act is only as broad as the definitions of these
two terms.
The definition of "debt" as provided in the Act limits its scope to
consumer debt. 9 A debt incurred primarily for consumer purposes falls
within the Act's definition of debt even if it also partially serves a
business purpose.2°
A "debt collector" includes any person who uses any instrumentality
of interstate commerce in a business whose principle purpose is debt
collection (i.e., a collection agency) or any person who regularly collects,
or attempts to collect, debts owed to another person.2 A creditor who
collects his own debts does not fall within the Act's definition of a debt
collector,22 provided that the creditor does not seek to collect the debts
under an assumed name23 and the principal business of the creditor is
"The term "debt" means any obligation or alleged obligation of a
consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money,
property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction
are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, whether or
not such obligation has been reduced to judgment.
15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5).
's The term "debt collector" means any person who uses any instrumen-
tality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal
purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly
collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due
or asserted to be owed or due another. Notwithstanding the exclusion
provided by clause (F) of the last sentence of this paragraph, the term
includes any creditor who, in the process of collecting his own debts,
uses any name other than his own which would indicate that a third
person is collecting or attempting to collect such debts.
Id. § 1692a(6).
'9 Id. § 1692a(5).
20 See id.
21 See Kempfv. Famous Barr Co., 676 F. Supp. 937, 938 (E.D. Mo. 1988).
22 See, e.g., Teng v. Metropolitan Retail Recovery, Inc., 851 F. Supp. 61,
66 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (emphasizing that a "debt collector" under the statutory
definition collects debts "owed or due another").
' The test is whether the assumed name would indicate to the consumer that
a third party is collecting the debt on behalf of the creditor. See 15 U.S.C. §
1692a(6).
1996-97]
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not debt collection.24 Officers or employees of a creditor are also
excluded from coverage when collecting debts on behalf of the employ-
er.
25
Under this definition, an attorney collecting his own fees would not
be covered by the Act. Nor would in-house counsel be covered, provided
that the in-house attorney collects the debts in the name of the employer
and not as an independent attorney. 26
The decision in Heintz v. Jenkins27 established that an attorney who
collects consumer debts for others may be considered a debt collector for
purposes of the FDCPA regardless of whether that attorney collects the
consumer debts through litigation or traditional debt collection meth-
ods.28 However, not all attorneys who collect consumer debts necessarily
will be considered debt collectors. To be considered a debt collector, an
attorney must engage in debt collection activities on a regular basis.29
Defining "regular basis" for purposes of liability under the FDCPA
poses an especially difficult problem for attorneys. Traditional debt
collection agencies clearly must comply with the Act because their entire
business activity is devoted to collecting consumer debts for others.3° At
the other end of the spectrum are retailers, lending agencies, and other
creditors who collect only their own debts and need not comply with the
Act as long as they do not collect their debts under an assumed name.3"
Attorneys, on the other hand, do not enjoy the same certainty. Attorneys
often collect debts as a service to clients incidental to some other type of
representation. There can be no assurances as to when or if this practice
will be considered debt collection on a "regular basis."
The decision in Heintz offers little guidance in determining at what
point an attorney's collection activity will become "regular."3 2 Lower
24 See id. § 1692a(6)(B).
25 See id. § 1692a(6)(A); Kizer v. Finance Am. Credit Corp., 454 F. Supp.
937 (N.D. Miss. 1978); Sterling Mirror of Md., Inc. v. Gordon, 619 A.2d 64
(D.C. App. 1993).
26 See Dorsey v. Morgan, 760 F. Supp. 509, 514 (D. Md. 1991).
27 Heintz v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 1489 (1995).
28 Id. at 1493.
29 See supra note 18 for the definition of a "debt collector"; see also Mertes
v. Devitt, 734 F. Supp. 872, 874 (W.D. Wis. 1990) (holding attorney who
averaged less than two collection matters per year comprising less than one
percent of his practice did not regularly collect or attempt to collect debts of
another and, therefore, was not a "debt collector" under the FDCPA).
30 See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
31 See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
32 See infra notes 92-134 and accompanying text for an in-depth discussion
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courts have typically considered two key factors of the debt collection
activities: its frequency and its substantiality.33 Additionally, when the
client is a collection agency, courts will also take into consideration
"whether or not there is found to be an ongoing relationship between the
attorney and the collection agency he represented."34
There is no exact formula for determining when an attorney's debt
collection activities become "regular" so as to subject that attorney to
exposure to liability under the FDCPA. Therefore, it is recommended that
any attorney who performs even very little collection work obtain a
working knowledge of the provisions of the Act.
B. Regulatory Provisions of the FDCPA
The FDCPA governs the conduct of debt collectors35 in four primary
areas. First, the FDCPA governs communications by the debt collector
both to the debtor and to third parties concerning the debt.36 Second, the
FDCPA requires validation of a debt at the initial stage of debt collec-
tion.37 Third, the FDCPA prohibits "unfair" practices.3" Finally, the
FDCPA governs the venue(s) in which an action may be brought to
recover a consumer debt.39
1. The Regulation of
Communications by the Debt Collector
The FDCPA regulates three types of communications made by a debt
collector: communications made to third parties in which information is
of Heintz.
" See, e.g., Mertes, 734 F. Supp. at 875; Stojanovski and Strobl &
Manoogian, P.C., 783 F. Supp. 319, 322 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (law firm which had
an ongoing relationship with a corporate client, who presumably had many
overdue accounts, did collect debts on a regular basis, although the firm's
collection practices comprised less than four percent of its total business; it is the
volume of debt collection efforts, not the percentage of such efforts in relation
to the attorney's total practice,'that is dispositive).
31 Cacace v. Lucas, 775 F. Supp. 502, 504 (D. Conn. 1990).
" See supra note 18 for a definition of debt collector.
36 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692b-1692d.
31 Id. § 1692g.
3 1 Id. §§ 1692e-1692f.
31 Id. § 1692i(a).
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sought about the debtor,4" abusive communications, 41 and false or mis-
leading representations. 42 For purposes of the Act, a "communication" is
defined as "the conveying of information regarding a debt directly or
indirectly to any person through any medium."43
The regulation that is of particular concern to attorneys lies within the
prohibition against "false or misleading" representations made by a debt
collector to a debtor or to a third party.' The Act prohibits threatening legal
action unless (1) that action can legally be taken and (2) the debt collector
actually intends to take that action.45 A debt collector should never threaten
to take legal action without the authority and intent to take that action,46 and
the debt collector should follow through with the threat, when appropriate, in
order to ensure compliance with the Act.47
Another simple, yet extremely important, provision requires that all
collector/debtor communications attempting to collect a debt include a
warning that the debt collector is "attempting to collect a debt, and that any
information obtained will be used for that purpose."'48 These exact words
should be included in every communication to a debtor, whether written or
oral.4
9
2. The Requirement of Debt Validation
In addition to regulating communications by debt collectors, the FDCPA
also requires that a debt collector provide a "Validation Notice" to a debtor
401 d. §§ 1692b, 1692c(b).
41 Id. § 1692d.
42 Id. § 1692e.
41 Id. § 1692a(2).
44 Id. § 1692e.
41 Id. § 1692e(5).
46 See United States v. National Fin. Serv., Inc., 820 F. Supp. 228, 234 (D.
Md. 1993) (holding debt collector made threat of legal action without the intent
to follow through when debt collector did not have procedures in place for filing
suit), affd, 98 F.3d 131 (4th Cir. 1996).
41 See Pearce v. Rapid Check Collection, Inc., 738 F. Supp. 334, 338
(D.S.D. 1990) (holding that evidence did not support conclusion that debt
collector did not intend to follow through with threatened legal action in light of
the fact that suit was actually filed).
48 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(1 1) (applying to "all communications made to collect
a debt or to obtain information about a consumer" - presumably also covering
third parties).
'9 See Tolentino v. Friedman, 46 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir.) (holding that an
attorney violated the Act by failing to include the warning in a follow-up letter),
cert. denied subnom. Friedman v. Tolentino, 115 S. Ct. 2613 (1995).
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at the initial stage of debt collection."0 This validation notice must be in
writing and sent to a debtor within five days of a debt collector's initial
contact with the debtor."' The Act requires that five statements be
included in every validation notice.5 2 These statements, which are
typically incorporated into the language of the validation notice, serve to
inform the debtor of the amount of the debt, the name of the creditor, and
the debtor's rights with regard to contesting the validity of the debt. 3
While the statements that must be conveyed are relatively uncomplicated,
a debt collector must be wary of potential pitfalls arising when actually
communicating the statements to a debtor.
One area of potential trouble arises because the Act requires a
statement that the debtor has thirty days from receipt of the validation
notice to challenge the validity of the debt or the debt will be assumed
valid. 4 In drafting the communication to a debtor, a debt collector must
be certain that no other portion of the letter conflicts with this state-
ment.5 For example, a statement demanding payment within ten days
coupled with a threat of legal action if payment is not received would
so Id. § 1692g.
s' Id. § 1692g(a).
52 The following statements should be included in a validation notice:
(1) the amount of the debt;
(2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed;
(3) a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after
receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion
thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector;
(4) a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in
writing within the thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof,
is disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a
copy of a judgment against the consumer and a copy of such verifica-
tion or judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt collector;
and
(5) a statement that, upon the consumer's written request within the
thirty-day period, the debt collector will provide the consumer with the
name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current
creditor.
Id.
S3 Id.
" Id. § 1692g(3); see also Bingham v. Collection Bureau, Inc., 505 F. Supp.
864, 871 (D.N.D. 1981) (holding that thirty-day notice should be included in the
first mailed validation notice from the debt collector to the debtor).
ss See Miller v. Payco-General Am. Credits, Inc., 943 F.2d 482, 484 (4th
Cir. 1991).
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violate the Act because it would indicate that the debtor does not have
thirty days to contest the validity of the debt.56
Similarly, a debt collector must be certain that separate communica-
tions with a debtor within the thirty day period are not contradictory. For
example, a debt collector is permitted to pursue collection efforts within
the thirty day period, unless the debtor disputes the validity of the
debt.57 However, any such subsequent communication cannot state that
the debt will be considered valid at a date before the termination of the
thirty day period.5 8 An attorney acting as a debt collector should be
aware that a communication with a debtor following a judgment is
considered an "initial communication" requiring a validation notice. 9
Another area requiring care by debt collectors is the form of the
notice. The required statements in a validation notice must be conveyed
"effectively,"60 as determined under the "least sophisticated debtor"
test.61 Under this test, the initial communication taken as a whole, as
well as subsequent communications, must not mislead the unsophisticated
debtor into foregoing or ignoring his rights under the Act.62 Factors
considered by the courts include location, type size, and the graphic
impact of the information conveyed to the debtor. 3 The information
must be large enough to be easily read and it must be placed in a
prominent position in the notice.' Courts will also consider whether the
debt collector has included statements that tend to contradict the
validation notice.65
56 See Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107, 111 (3d Cir. 1991).
" See Rabideau v. Management Adjustment Bureau, 805 F. Supp. 1086,
1094 (W.D.N.Y. 1992).
5 See Robinson v. Transworld Sys., Inc., 876 F. Supp. 385, 391 (N.D.N.Y.
1995); see also Ost v. Collection Bureau, Inc., 493 F. Supp. 701, 704 (D.N.D.
1980) (holding that collection agency did not comply with validation requirement
because demands were sent to debtor prior to sending the validation notice).
'9 See Frey v. Gangwish, 970 F.2d 1516, 1518-19 (6th Cir. 1992).
60 See Bukumirovich v. Credit Bureau of Baton Rouge, Inc., 155 F.R.D.
146, 148 (M.D. La. 1994).
61 See Graziano, 950 F.2d at 111 (citing Bakery. G.C. Servs., 677 F.2d 775,
778 (9th Cir. 1982)) (The Graziano court indicates that "least sophisticated
consumer" is more accurate, but that "least sophisticated debtor" follows the
usage in the reported case law. See id. at 778 n.5).
62 See Higgins v. Capitol Credit Servs., Inc., 762 F. Supp. 1128, 1133 (D.
Del. 1991).
63 See Bukumirovich, 155 F.R.D. at 148.
6 See id.
65 See Miller v. Payco-General Am. Credits, Inc., 943 F.2d 482, 484 (4th
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Due to the fact that the validation notification must be in writing66
and that an omission of any provision constitutes a violation,67 a debtor
will have little difficulty in proving a violation of the section. This
makes strict compliance essential. However, the forthright debt collec-
tor should find little difficulty complying with this section of the
Act.
3. The Prohibition
Against Unfair Practices
The FDCPA prohibits debt collectors from engaging in "unfair or
unconscionable" practices for the purpose of collecting a debt. 8 Acts of
a debt collector that would constitute a violation of the Act include
collecting any amount not expressly authorized by the instrument creating
the debt.69 These amounts include items such as interest, fees, charges,
and attorney's fees.7" A debt collector is also prohibited from accepting
a check post-dated by more than five days unless the debt collector
notifies the debtor that the debt collector intends to deposit the check
three to ten days prior to doing so; soliciting a postdated check for the
purpose of threatening criminal prosecution; and depositing a post-dated
check prior to the date on the check. 7' Finally, the Act prohibits a debt
collector from communicating with a debtor via postcard,72 because this
type of communication would allow third parties to read the communica-
tion. Similarly, any envelope used to send a communication to a debtor
must not indicate that the sender is a debt collector.7'
Cir. 1991).
66 See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a).
67 See West v. Costen, 558 F. Supp. 564, 580 (W.D. Va. 1983) (holding
debt collector who failed to give debtors written notice of their right to dispute
debts within thirty days violated the validation requirement).
68 15 U.S.C. § 1692f.
69 Id. § 1692f(l); see also Heintz v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 1489 (1995),
discussed infra notes 92-134 and accompanying text.
70 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1); see also Strange v. Wexler, 796 F. Supp. 1117,
1118 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (holding attorney violated the Act by demanding his fee
in a lawsuit to collect a debt).
71 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(2)-(4).
72 Id. § 1692f(7).
13 Id. § 1692f(8); see also Rutyna v. Collection Accounts Terminal, Inc.,
478 F. Supp. 980, 982 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
1996-97]
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4. The Venue Provision
As the final key area of regulation, the FDCPA regulates the venue
in which an action may be brought to collect a debt.74 The Act provides
that a legal action on a debt may be brought only in the "judicial district
or similar legal entity" in which: (1) the consumer resides, (2) the
consumer signed the contract creating the debt, or (3) real property
securing the debt is located, if applicable.75 The "judicial district or
similar legal entity" is the federal district when filing in federal court, and
the similar legal entity as established by the particular state law when
filing in state court.76 An attorney filing an action must be careful when
seeking to transfer venue because transferring an action on a debt to a
venue not proper under the FDCPA would violate the Act, even though
permitted under the applicable transfer of venue statute.77
C. Civil Liability Under the FDCPA
The FDCPA expressly provides for civil liability for violations of the
Act.78 A debt collector found in violation of the Act can be held liable
for actual damages, statutory damages (which are punitive in nature) and
reasonable costs and attorney's fees. 9 In some cases, debt collectors
may also be held liable for damages for emotional or mental distress."
Such damages are reserved only for instances involving "extreme and
outrageous conduct., 8 Actual damages are predicated upon a showing
74 15 U.S.C. § 1692i.
75 Id. § 1692i(a).
76 See Action Prof 1 Serv. v. Kiggins, 458 N.W.2d 365, 367 (S.D. 1990).
77 See Fox v. Citicorp Credit Servs., Inc., 15 F.3d 1507, 1515 (9th Cir.
1994) (holding transfer to unauthorized venue was a violation of the Act, and the
fact that Arizona provided a formal transfer mechanism was irrelevant).
78 15 U.S.C. § 1692k.
79 Id. § 1692k(a).
80 See Teng v. Metropolitan Retail Recovery, Inc., 851 F. Supp. 61, 67-68
(E.D.N.Y. 1994) (debt collector was assessed $1000 in actual damages for
emotional distress for falsely representing to the debtor that there was a family
emergency in order to obtain personal information and later impersonating a
Marshal and threatening to take the debtor's furniture).
81 See Venes v. Professional Serv. Bureau, Inc., 353 N.W.2d 671, 674
(Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (debt collector's repeated abusive telephone calls to the
debtor in which the debtor was called a "deadbeat" and warned to "stay out of
Minnesota if you know what's good for you and your family" qualified as
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by the debtor of actual pecuniary injury; however, no such requirement
exists for the debtor to collect statutory damages." Courts do not require
a showing of actual pecuniary injury to collect statutory damages because
doing so would limit the Act's effectiveness by placing an extra burden
on the complaining party. 3
Statutory damages are limited to $1000 per action by an individual
and the lesser of $500,000 or one percent of the debt collector's net
worth per class action.84 The $1000 maximum statutory penalty is not
awarded per violation.85 Rather, a single action involving multiple
violations of the Act against one individual can give rise only to a
maximum of $1000 in statutory damages.8 6
Factors considered by the courts when determining the amount of
statutory damages to award include "the frequency and persistence of
noncompliance by the debt collector, the nature of such noncompliance,
and the extent to which such noncompliance was intentional;... 87 In
a class action, additional factors of "the resources of the debt collector"
and "the number of persons adversely affected" are also considered.8
Isolated violations of the Act will typically result in statutory damages
considerably less than the $1000 maximum.89
Although the Act provides for civil liability, such liability is not
assessed in every case. A debtor is not required to prove intent in order
to establish a violation, but a debt collector can avoid liability upon a
extreme and outrageous conduct. Id. at 675.).
82 See Harvey v. United Adjusters, 509 F. Supp. 1218, 1221-22 (D. Or.
1981).
83 See id.
84 See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2).
81 See Wright v. Financial Serv. of Norwalk, Inc., 22 F.3d 647, 651 (6th
Cir. 1994); Harper v. Better Bus. Servs., Inc., 961 F.2d 1561, 1563 (1 1th Cir.
1992).
86 See Masuda v. Thomas Richards & Co., 759 F. Supp. 1456, 1467 (C.D.
Cal. 1991).
87 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(b)(1).
88 Id. § 1692k(b)(2).
89 See Strange v. Wexler, 796 F. Supp. 1117, 1120 (N.D. Ill. 1992)
(awarding $250 in statutory damages for sending form letter to debtor improperly
stating that debtor was liable for attorney's fees); Young v. Credit Bureau of
Lockport, Inc., 729 F. Supp. 1421, 1422 (W.D.N.Y. 1989) (awarding $100 in
statutory damages for failure to include warning in communication to debtor that
the debt collector was attempting to collect a debt and that all information
obtained must be used for that purpose).
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showing "by a preponderance of evidence that the violation was not
intentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the
maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such
error. '90 Thus, while intent need not be proven, lack of intent may
excuse a violation.9"
II. ANALYSIS OF HEN7Z V. JENKINS
Recently, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a lawyer
who regularly collects consumer debts through litigation falls within the
FDCPA's definition of a "debt collector."'92 The plaintiff, Darlene
Jenkins, brought suit under the FDCPA after George Heintz, a lawyer
representing a creditor of Jenkins, wrote a letter to Jenkins' attorney
misstating the amount owed.93 In ruling that a lawyer who regularly
collects debts through litigation is not exempt from liability under the
FDCPA, the Supreme Court based its decision upon two premises: the
plain language of the statute, and the 1986 Amendment to the Act
removing the broad exemption for attorneys.94
A. The Plain Language of the Statute
First, the Court noted that the plain language of the statute, in
defining a debt collector, encompasses debt collection activities by a
lawyer even when conducted through litigation.95 The Act defines a
"debt collector" as one who "regularly collects or attempts to collect,
directly or indirectly, [consumer] debts owed or due or asserted to be
owed or due another." 96 The Court held that litigation is just another
10 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c); see also Fox v. Citicorp Credit Servs., Inc., 15
F.3d 1507, 1514 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding debt collector did not fall within bona
fide error exception due to the absence of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid
errors in transferring accounts).
91 See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c).
92 Heintz v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 1489 (1995). For a discussion of the
definition of debt collector, see supra notes 18-34 and accompanying text.
9 Id. (Heintz included in the total amount due the $4173 cost of auto
insurance, which the creditor had purchased after Jenkins had failed to do so, and
which was not part of the original debt).94 Id. at 1491.
95 Id.
96 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6); Heintz, 115 S. Ct. at 1490.
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way to obtain payment of consumer debts;97 therefore, "a lawyer who
regularly tries to obtain payment of consumer debts through legal
proceedings is a lawyer who regularly 'attempts' to 'collect' those
consumer debts."98 In support of this proposition, the Court cited the
Black's Law Dictionary definition of debt collection: "'To collect a debt
or claim is to obtain payment or liquidation of it, either by personal
solicitation or legal proceedings.' "'9
The Court addressed the potential absurdities that the Sixth Circuit in
Green v. Hocking' claimed would result from subjecting attorneys
who collect debts primarily through litigation to the Act's provisions,'0 '
stating that these results depended upon literal readings of the Act's
provisions not likely to be endorsed by the courts.'0 2 First, the Court
pointed out that § 1692e(5), which forbids a debt collector from making
any threat or taking any action that cannot legally be taken, must be read
in light of § 1692k(c), which provides that a debt collector is not liable
under the FDCPA "if he 'shows by a preponderance of the evidence that
the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error
notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to
97 Heintz, 115 S. Ct. at 1491.
98 id.
99 Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 263 (6th ed. 1990)).
10o Green v. Hocking, 9 F.3d 18 (6th Cir. 1993).
1 The Green court ruled that subjecting attorneys engaged in purely legal
activities to liability under the provisions of the FDCPA would produce "absurd
outcomes." The court noted that, if read literally, § 1692c(c), which provides that
all debt collections must cease once the debtor so requests, and § 1692g(b),
which provides that a debt collector must cease collection efforts if the debtor
disputes the amount owed within thirty days of receiving the initial communica-
tion from the debt collector, would prevent an attorney from initiating a lawsuit
or proceeding with an already existing lawsuit. The court stated that, if an
attorney initiated a lawsuit and the debtor disputed the amount owed, the attorney
would be prevented from bringing a motion for summary judgment. Furthermore,
the court stated that if an attorney wrote a letter to a debtor and the debtor
asked that the communications cease, the attorney would be prevented from
initiating a lawsuit altogether. The court also stated that § 1692c(b), which
prevents a debt collector from communicating with any third party concerning
a consumer's debt, would make it "unlawful for an attorney to communicate with
the court or the clerk's office by filing suit." The court further noted that
§ 1692e(5), which makes threats to take any action that cannot legally be taken
unlawful, would subject an attorney to liability anytime the attorney brings a law
suit and is unsuccessful. See id. at 21.
102 Heintz, 115 S. Ct. at 1491.
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avoid such error.' "103 Section 1692k(c) would enable an attorney in an
unsuccessful suit to avoid liability under the Act upon a showing of
lack of intent and bona fide error, a burden the Court deemed reason-
able.
0 4
The Court in Heintz did not address the impact that application of the
FDCPA to attorneys collecting debts through litigation would have on
Rule 11.105 Section 1692k(c) has the effect of limiting the liability of
an attorney who collects debts through litigation to instances in which
that attorney would be liable under Rule 11 anyway.0 6 The standard for
liability under both provisions is negligence." 7 Under the negligence
standard, an attorney would be subject to sanctions under Rule 11 and
under § 1692e(5) for an unsuccessful suit only when the attorney failed
103 Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c) (1988 and Supp. V)).
104 Id.
105 See supra note 101 for an overview of issues addressed by the Heintz
Court. Rule 11 states:
By presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or
later advocating) a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney
or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable
under the circumstances, -
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as
to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the
cost of litigation;
(2) the claim, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are
warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establish-
ment of new law;
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentia-
ry support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have
evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further
investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the
evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonable based on a
lack of information or belief.
FED. R. CIv. P. 1 l(b)(1)-(4).
106 See Green, 9 F.3d at 22 (stating that there are many similarities between
Rule 11 and the FDCPA).
107 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (requiring "reasonable" investigation); see also
Bingham v. Collection Bureau, Inc., 505 F. Supp. 864, 870 (D.N.D. 1981)
(holding standard of conduct under § 1692k to which debtor is held is on the low
end of the spectrum of the reasonable person).
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to reasonably investigate the claim. 8 The result is that the provisions
overlap in application.
Despite the overlap, two major differences remain in the application
of Rule 11 and § 1692k(c). First, as noted by the Sixth Circuit in Green
v. Hocking, sanctions under the FDCPA are mandatory;0 9 therefore, an
attorney who collects consumer debts through litigation and violates Rule
11, thereby violating § 1692e(5), would be subject to mandatory
sanctions. On the other hand, an attorney engaged in litigation not for the
purpose of collecting consumer debts who, through similar conduct,
violates Rule 11 would not necessarily be subjected to sanctions. In this
situation, the attorney's liability would depend on the court's discre-
tion,110 presumably allowing the attorney the opportunity to explain to
the court why sanctions may not be appropriate in that instance. The
result is different treatment for like conduct due merely to a difference
in the type of litigation involved.
A second difference in the application of Rule 11 and § 1692k(c) lies
with the burden of proof. Under Rule 11, sanctions may be imposed
against an attorney upon motion by the opposing party or on the court's
own initiative."' On motion, the burden of proving that an attorney did
not reasonably investigate the claim and, therefore, should be subject to
sanctions, lies with the moving party." 2 When a court on its own
initiative imposes sanctions, the court enters an order describing the
conduct that appears to violate Rule 11."' Presumably, the court would
enter such an order only after determining that such charges are
warranted; therefore, the initial burden of proof lies with the court.
On the other hand, § 1692k(c) is an affirmative defense; therefore,
the attorney who has been charged with a violation of the FDCPA has the
burden of proof with regard to a reasonable investigation.' The burden
of pleading under the FDCPA is minimal. The complaining party must
only allege and prove noncompliance with a provision of the Act and has
'0' See Green, 9 F.3d at 22; see supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
109 Id.
,"o Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990) (court of
appeals should use abuse-of-discretion standard when reviewing all Rule 11
determinations).
"' FED. R. Civ. P. 1l(c)(1).
112 See id. at 1 l(c)(1)(A); see also Vandeventerv. Wabash Nat'l Corp., 893
F. Supp. 827, 840 (N.D. Ind. 1995).
"1 See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 l(c)(1)(B).
"' See Fox v. Citicorp Credit Servs., Inc., 15 F.3d 1507 (9th Cir. 1994).
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no burden of proof with regard to the reasonableness of the attorney's
conduct." 5
The effect of (1) mandatory sanctions under the FDCPA and (2) the
shift of the burden of proof with regard to the reasonableness of the
attorney's conduct from the complaining party under Rule 11 to the
attorney under § 1692k(c) is that an attorney engaged in litigation for the
purpose of collecting consumer debts has a greater chance of being
subjected to liability than his counterpart engaged in other types of
litigation. The Court in Heintz avoided addressing this particular issue by
stating that, regardless of the effect of § 1692e(5), "we do not see how
the fact that a lawsuit turns out ultimately to be unsuccessful could, by
itself, make the bringing of it an 'action that cannot legally be tak-
en.' 11 6 The accuracy of that statement remains to be seen.
Another "absurd"'1 result discussed by the Sixth Circuit in Green
v. Hocking"8 is the effect of § 1692c(c), which prohibits communica-
tions with a debtor who notifies the debt collector that he refuses to pay
and/or does not wish to be contacted again." 9 The court in Green
reasoned that this section would serve to prohibit an attorney from filing
a collection action after a debt has been contested or the debtor has
communicated his desire not to be contacted again.120 The Court in
Heintz noted that § 1692c(c) provides an exception that permits the debt
collector to notify the consumer that he may invoke or intends to invoke
a specific remedy.' The Court read this exception as applying to filing
an action to collect a debt, reasoning that filing an action is tanta-
mount to notifying the consumer of an intent to invoke a specific
remedy. 122
The Court in Heintz failed to address another provision of § 1692c,
which prohibits communications to third parties concerning a consumer's
' "[A]ny debt collector who fails to comply with any provision of this
subchapter with respect to any person is liable to such person. . . ." 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692k(a). See Baker v. G.C. Servs. Corp., 677 F.2d 775, 780 (9th Cir. 1982)
(statutory damages are available merely upon proof of violation); Cacace v.
Lucas, 775 F. Supp. 502, 505 (D. Conn. 1990) (proof of one violation of
FDCPA is sufficient to support judgment for the plaintiff).
116 Heintz v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 1489, 1491 (1995).
117 Green v. Hocking, 9 F.3d 18, 22 (6th Cir. 1993).
"s Id. at 21; see supra note 101.
119 Green, 9 F.3d at 21.
120 id.
121 Heintz, 115 S. Ct. at 1491-92.
122Id. at 1492.
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debt.'2 The Sixth Circuit stated that this section would prohibit attor-
neys from filing complaints with a court or that court's clerk because
these would amount to a communication to a third party. 24 Section
1692c(b) provides an exception to the prohibition on communication to
third parties if the communication is "reasonably necessary to effectu-
ate a post judgment judicial remedy;"'25 however, the statute does not
specifically provide an exception for communications necessary to
institute a judicial proceeding. The omission of a provision permit-
ting suits to be initiated indicates that Congress may have intended not
to regulate filing suits and, more generally, not to regulate litiga-
tion.
B. The 1986 Amendment
The second premise upon which the Court in Heintz based its
decision was the 1986 amendment to the FDCPA that removed the broad
exemption for attorneys.'26 Prior to 1986, the FDCPA stated that a
"debt collector" did not include "any attorney-at-law collecting a debt as
an attorney on behalf of and in the name of the client."'2 7 The Court
noted that this exemption was completely removed in 19868 and was
not replaced with a more narrow exemption for attorneys collecting debts
through litigation. 9 This fact led the Court to conclude that Congress
intended for attorneys to be subject to the FDCPA whenever they met the
Act's definition of a "debt collector."'30
Although Representative Annunzio, speaking as the sponsor of the
bill, stated that the FDCPA as amended in 1986 was not intended to
cover attorneys engaged in purely legal tasks,'3 ' the Court in Heintz
dismissed this as merely one representative's opinion expressed after the
amendment was passed and not necessarily indicative of the consensus
3 See 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b).
24 Green, 9 F.3d at 21.
125 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b).
126 Heintz, 115 S. Ct. at 1492.
127 Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-109, § 803(6)(F), 91
Stat. 874, 875 (1977), amended by Pub. L. No. 99-361, 100 Stat 768 (1986)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692o (1994)).
128 See Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 99-361, 100 Stat. 768
(1986) (amending Pub. L. No. 95-109, § 803(6)(F)).
'
29 Heintz, 115 S. Ct. at 1491.
13 2 id.131 132 CONG. REc. 30,842 (1986).
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opinion on the Act's applicability.' The Court also dismissed the
Federal Trade Commission's staff commentary, which also stated that the
FDCPA as amended should not apply to attorneys engaged in purely legal
tasks. 33 The Court stated that the Federal Trade Commission, although
charged with enforcement of the FDCPA, did not have the authority to
create an exception that "falls outside the range of reasonable interpreta-
tions of the Act's express language.
' 134
III. THE IMPACT OF HEINTZ ON ATTORNEYS
Some might question how much, if any, impact the decision in Heintz
will have on the day-to-day practice of attorneys. Certainly for the
attorney whose practice is entirely devoted to collection work and who
has enjoyed freedom from regulation under the Act, the decision in
Heintz will have a significant impact. That attorney may no longer pursue
collections with relative impunity. Moreover, with the exception of the
ability to represent creditors in court, the attorney will no longer have a
competitive edge over his traditional, non-attorney debt-collecting
counterparts, because the attorney will have the same limitations imposed
on him as have collection agencies.
For an attorney who engages in consumer debt collection less
frequently and primarily engages in litigation or other "legal" activities
unrelated to consumer debt collection, the impact of Heintz will be less
significant. The result in Heintz is consistent with a central reason
expressed by Congress for removing the exemption for attorneys:
"substantial concern with lawyers who were unfairly competing with
collection firms and abusing their exemption from FDCPA cover-
age.
135
Removal of the exception followed by application of the "regularly
collects" limitation in the Act will ensure that those attorneys who
infrequently collect debts, regardless of the method, will be spared
liability under the Act. However, an attorney who, for example,
frequently initiates foreclosure actions on behalf of a creditor and who
previously could do so with impunity will now be forced to bear the
132 Heintz, 115 S. Ct. at 1492.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 1492-93.
131 Mertest v. Debitt, 734 F. Supp. 872, 874 (W.D. Wis. 1990) (citing H.R.
REP. No. 405, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1752).
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"burden" of compliance with the Act. The end result is that those
attorneys who are "in the business of collecting debts" will be regulated
and those who are not will not.
136
Regardless of whether an attorney is one who rarely collects
consumer debts or is one who is essentially a debt collection agent with
a license to practice law, the scrupulous attorney who abides by the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct will find that the Act adds little to
the "burdens" of fairness and professional courtesy already mandated by
the Model Rules.
One might think that the Act would hinder an attorney's ability to
represent his client "with reasonable diligence" as required by Model
Rule 1.3.13' However, a comparison of the Act's restrictions with the
remaining provisions of the Model Rules reveals that the Act places few
limitations on the attorney's ability to represent his client not already
provided for by the Model Rules.
Rules 4.1 through 4.4 of the Model Rules, which govern an attorney's
transactions with persons other than his client, provide the regulations on
attorney conduct that most closely parallel the Act's provisions. Rule 4.1
prohibits a lawyer from knowingly making a false statement to a third
party.13' Any violation of the Act's prohibition against any "false, de-
ceptive, or misleading representation... in connection with the collection
of any debt' 139 would also violate Rule 4.1. Similarly, Rule 4.2 prohib-
its a lawyer from communicating about the subject of his representation
with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by another attorney.
1 41
This same prohibition appears in the Act.' 4' Finally, Rule 4.4 provides
that a lawyer "shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other
than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person .... 14 The Com-
136 H.R. REP. No. 405, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1752, 1753.
137 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 (1992).
131 Id. Rule 4.1(a).
... 15 U.S.C. § 1692e; see supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text for a
discussion of this provision.
140 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.2 (1992).
'4' The FDCPA prohibits communications with the debtor "in connection
with the collection of any debt" when the attorney knows that the debtor is
"representedby an attorney with respect to such debt." 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2).
Communications "in connection with the collection of any debt" would be about
the subject of the attorney's representation in a collection case, so both
provisions apply to the same limited type of communications.
142 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 4.4 (1992).
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ment to the Rule explains that Rule 4.4 simply requires that lawyers show
respect for the rights of third parties.'4 3 Strict compliance with this Rule
would also avoid any violation of the Act's prohibitions against "engag-
[ing] in any conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass,
oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection of a
debt! " as well as the prohibition against the "use [of] unfair or
unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.' 45
These provisions of the Act constitute the "meat" of the restrictions
and prohibitions contained in the Act. It should be no surprise that the
Act and the Model Rules overlap significantly because both serve to
ensure that those governed by their provisions act in an etical manner.
When taken in conjunction with the application of Rule 11 discussed m
Part II of tis Note,146 the Model Rules leave attorneys little rope with
which to hang themselves.
CONCLUSION
The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act is a potential source of
significant liability for attorneys engaged in debt collection. 147 As a
result of the decision in Heintz v. Jenlans, attorneys who collect debts
solely through legal proceedings and do not employ traditional debt
collection methods are no longer exempt from the Act's regulations. 14
The Act contains numerous regulatory provisions not discussed in this
Note.'49 Since most attorneys should not find compliance with the
FDCPA unduly burdensome or complicated and the potential for liability
is significant, every attorney who engages in any debt collection activities
should obtain a working knowledge of the Act's provisions in order to
ensure compliance.
"4 Id. Rule 4.4 (cmt.).
144 15 U.S.C. § 1692d.
141 Id. § 1692f; see supra notes 68-73 and accompanyingtext for a discussion
of this provision.
'46 See supra notes 92-134 and accompanying text.
'41 See supra notes 78-91 and accompanying text.
141 See supra notes 92-134 and accompanying text.
149 See supra notes 35-77 and accompanying text.
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